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How organizations exert leadership in interorganizational, predominantly hierarchical 
networks is well researched. However, there are also networks that are not hierarchical, but 
heterarchical in nature, i.e. where no organizational actor formally presides over the other 
member organizations and where leadership is nevertheless practised and accepted by 
network members. But how exactly is an organization able to lead under these structural 
conditions and, in particular, to capitalize – in the leadership process – on its membership in 
more than one network? Informed by structuration theory, we investigate this practice of 
‘network manoeuvring’, that is, how an organization skilfully takes advantage of the reciprocal 
influences between two different forms of networks. In particular, we study Intel de facto 
leading the SEMATECH consortium (i.e. a heterarchical network) and guiding technology 
development along its supply chain (i.e. a hierarchical network). Network manoeuvring is 
enabled in this case by two mutually reinforming practices (i.e. roadmapping and roadmap 
gap filling) centred around a key resource (i.e. a roadmap as an artefact). Based upon our 
findings, we provide practical guidance and theoretical insights on how and under what 
circumstances this kind of manoeuvring in and across two (different types of) networks 
substitutes for formally legitimated leadership.  
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Introduction  
Collaborating on a long-term basis in an interorganizational network of three or more entities is 
quite common for organizations, in particular in science-based industries like information and 
communication technology, biotechnology or photonics1. Building collaborative networks is 
motivated by factors such as sharing research and development costs and risks, gaining access to 
new markets and skills, or speeding up the introduction of new products or processes. Given the 
prevalence and significance of such networks, it is not surprising that previous research has 
concentrated upon how organizations are positioned within such networks and, ensuing from 
this, how they are able to exploit or improve their situation within and across networks2. Studies 
in the tradition of the relational view and literature on alliance portfolios in particular point at the 
beneficial role of dense relationships3. 
However, what is less often analyzed is how organizations actually lead such networks – 
comprehended as exerting an influence in order to make things happen, more often than not 
through the actions of others, in line with one’s own objectives that might conflict with other 
organizations’ interests4. These studies concentrate upon hierarchical networks that dispose of a 
formally legitimated lead organization directly or indirectly controlling the respective network 
activities. Although not explicitly targeting how leadership is exerted, the studies from a 
relational view help us to comprehend how managing network relationships can make a 
difference concerning knowledge sharing. Thereby, the leading organizations have been labelled, 
among others, hub firms, network orchestrators or strategic centres5. For instance, Lorenzoni and 
Baden-Fuller analyze how hierarchical networks surrounding companies like Apple, Nintendo, 
Sun or Toyota are successfully led by strategic centres. Flanking these studies concentrating 
upon single networks, recent research on alliance portfolios has added a new level of analysis 
and advanced our understanding concerning a focal organization’s embeddedness into multiple 
interorganizational constellations and the interdependencies between them6.  
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------------------------ 
Exhibit 1 about here 
------------------------ 
These studies, however, do not explicitly focus upon leadership practices in networks. In 
particular, those of the latter kind fail to do so, because portfolio approaches usually target only 
dyads and lack longitudinal and micro-level insights7. What is more, literature on 
interorganizational networks has paid little attention to leadership in networks that are not 
hierarchical, but heterarchical in nature, i.e. consisting of more or less equal partners that do not 
formally dispose of a leading actor. Despite extensive research on heterarchical structures in 
other than (inter) organizational settings (e.g. interpersonal networks concerning the 
development of open source software or multinational corporations) and their relevance and 
ubiquity in diverse fields, previous studies have seldom paid attention to the question of how 
such ‘leaderless networks’ can be led by one of their members8. This is unfortunate, since 
leadership in the sense of making things happen, often through the actions of others, clearly 
exists in such networks as well. Take for example production cooperatives in the wine industry 
or research and development consortia, including SEMATECH, in the semiconductor 
manufacturing industry.9 Against this background, this study asks: How and under what 
circumstances can an organization lead a heterarchical network?  
In this article we offer an answer to this question by studying the semiconductor industry, in 
which the SEMATECH consortium is positioned: a heterarchical network led by Intel. Intel 
achieves this factual leadership by network manoeuvring, a term we introduce to denote taking 
advantage of being engaged in different networks (here, more precisely, even two different types 
of networks: SEMATECH as a heterarchical network and parts of Intel’s supply chain conceived 
as a hierarchical network), whereby it is possible to capitalize skilfully on an imbalance between 
these networks in the absence of hierarchical fiat. According to our study, Intel achieves this by a 
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set of diverse leadership practices that make use of and, at the same time, influence the 
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) – an industry-wide projection of 
future technological milestones. As we will show, both networks are affected by the ITRS and 
Intel is able to influence what happens in both networks: in SEMATECH by filling gaps of the 
ITRS in the course of leading its supply chain, effectively leveraging its impact by intertwining 
the activities of both networks, that is, network manoeuvring. We utilize structuration theory10 to 
analyze this phenomenon, as it offers a framework that allows the incorporation of a multilevel 
and multidimensional analysis of network manoeuvring as a leadership practice without 
neglecting structural aspects. Moreover, structuration theory enables us to incorporate instability 
and conflicts in the course of network manoeuvring, rejecting the idea of stability, in particular in 
heterarchical networks.  
For practitioners, this study offers insights into how leadership in a heterarchical network can 
be achieved by means of manoeuvring skilfully between different (types of) networks by 
pointing at the two intertwined leadership practices each consisting of a subset of micro-
practices. Furthermore, it points at the importance of venturing beyond more macro-oriented 
portfolio approaches as well as beyond isolated accounts of single networks. For academics, our 
concept of manoeuvring is interesting as it expands – in line with Gulati’s call – the scope of 
present research on interorganizational networks beyond single networks. In addition, a 
structuration approach allows for the conception of leadership in heterarchical networks as 
structured and structuring practices, and permits us to venture beyond explanations focusing 
upon isolated events or accounts of reputation or financial power – predominantly related to 
hierarchical networks – that could not, alone, explain Intel’s influence.  
In the remainder of the paper we develop and position our structurationist conception of 
network manoeuvring and contrast hierarchical and heterarchical networks to introduce the two 
types of networks within which Intel operates. Next, we explain how we collected and analysed 
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our data. Subsequently, we set forth how network manoeuvring in and across two types of 
networks unfolds by indicating a subset of relevant practices that elucidate how Intel is able to 
exert leadership by means of making use of the ITRS. We conclude by discussing implications 
of network manoeuvring in managerial practice and sketch options for future network research. 
 
Conceptual and theoretical background  
Leadership in networks has been addressed from a variety of disciplines, focusing not only on 
interpersonal and intraorganizational networks, but also on interorganizational networks, from 
open source software development to joint ventures and strategic alliance systems11. Given our 
focus on network manoeuvring as a leadership practice by a single organization, we position our 
study in the rich tradition of research on interorganizational alliances and networks. Before we 
identify issues that still need further exploration, we offer a brief definition of the key concepts 
of this study, that is, contrasting hierarchical and heterarchical interorganizational networks and 
the leadership therein before we introduce our structurationist perspective on leadership 
practices. 
 
Leadership in interorganizational networks  
The kind of leadership that interests us in this paper occurs in interorganizational networks, 
conceived as a social system in which the activities of at least three formally independent legal 
entities are coordinated in time-space, i.e. there is some reflexively agreed upon inter-firm 
division of labour and cooperation among the network members12. This definition presents the 
interorganizational network as a form of governance rather than offering a network analytic 
perspective. As shown in Table 1 with regard to their different features, this governance can take 
on two distinct forms: hierarchical and heterarchical, which are characterized by distinct 
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properties (see Table 1) but obviously overlap in reality and, therefore, should be conceived as 
extreme points of a bipolar continuum. 
------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------- 
Accounts of hierarchical networks point at an officially / formally legitimated leadership 
exerting organization. The lead organization is enduringly able to control the network-wide 
activities due to having the respective authority-based backing. Previous research has labelled 
such organizations, among other terms, as network orchestrators, strategic centres or hub firms. 
This research can be traced back to the discussion of strategic networks and has been revived 
under the rubric of supply chains and supply networks13. One of the most influential works in 
this respect was that of Jarillo, who explicitly assumes a hierarchical structure within the 
respective network that is coordinated by a hub firm. For empirical evidence, these studies often 
refer to large multinational corporations and parts of their supply chain, or to Japanese keiretsu. 
In particular Dyer and colleagues, in promoting the relational view, hereby advance our 
understanding of how to organize such network forms. For the case of Toyota they show how 
establishing strong ties serves to lower transaction costs while still being able to improve the 
knowledge specialization of and knowledge transfer among partners. 
Research on leadership in heterarchical interorganizational networks is comparatively scarce 
and concentrates upon networks that lack formal central coordination, where decisions are 
officially made in consensus. Usually these networks exhibit some efforts of collective 
strategizing. Thereby actors attempt to assume a leading role in a concerted effort concerning the 
activities that are of relevance for them. However, due to a lack of hierarchical fiat and a 
correspondingly low degree of power differentials, their activities – more than in hierarchical 
networks – need to be accepted by the fellow network members. This also implies that leadership 
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in this type of network is particularly fragile and not necessarily enduring, rather temporary in 
nature14. Although the heterarchical character of interorganizational networks is hardly 
investigated, relevant issues have been addressed in related research on similar phenomena. For 
instance, studies devoted to network and alliance evolution offer fruitful insights into how 
networks of interorganizational relationships are formed. Representative of this stream of 
research are, for instance, studies by Rosenkopf and Tushman that have advanced our 
understanding of how networks and technology coevolve, focusing, among other things, upon 
the role of cooperative technical organizations that resemble our conception of heterarchical 
networks15. In a similar vein, studies on research and development consortia have shown that 
cooperation also relies upon informal coordination mechanisms to reach consensus (e.g. research 
emanating from the Minnesota innovation studies16). Furthermore, previous studies on regional 
networks or industrial clusters – for instance in Silicon Valley or Italian districts like Emilia 
Romagna – illuminate how organizations coevolve, although their unit of analysis is not usually 
a ‘whole network’ or ‘explicit constellations’ within these clusters17, but different complex, and 
often intransparent overlapping interorganizational relationships including dyads. Although these 
studies have advanced our understanding by directing our attention towards the consensus-based 
nature of these constellations, leadership issues are usually not explicitly addressed, although it is 
acknowledged that such networks are by no means a ‘leadership free vacuum’ or an egalitarian 
arena. Previous research by, among others, Huxham and Vangen, as well as Boari and Lipparini 
indicates that it seems rather more adequate to perceive heterarchical networks as a complex 
phenomenon whose governance remains unclear.  
Relating to these latter studies, we conceive leadership in interorganizational networks as 
influencing of the network activities by a single or by multiple organizations, whereby the 
respective organization(s) is or are “making things happen” (often through the actions of others 
as well). These activities are commonly perceived and accepted by the other network 
participants18. Though not geared towards the theme of leadership, but clearly set against the 
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backdrop thereof, illustrative evidence stems in this regard from supplier networks. Dyer and 
colleagues, for instance, identify mechanisms by which knowledge transfer was improved at 
Toyota via relation-specific capabilities and investing in the suppliers for joint purposes (e.g. by 
transferring personnel or investing capital).  
A specific leadership practice is network manoeuvring which is based upon the lead 
organizations capability to exploit its membership in more than one network. This capability can 
rest upon superior financial endowments, dependence on particular goods or services, 
organizational reputation and/or a network position offering access to superior knowledge19. 
Herein, parallels can be drawn to the well established literature on alliance portfolios. Although 
leadership is usually not studied, it is implied and the respective studies do inform us about the 
interdependencies among different alliances concerning potential benefits regarding learning and 
communication flows. However, it is worth noting that network manoeuvring and leadership in 
general do not necessarily assume an impact due to sheer dominance, e.g. in terms of market 
power, although this often occurs simultaneously. As we will illustrate empirically for the case 
of network manoeuvring between two different types of networks, leadership can also express 
itself in more subtle ways, as acting ‘behind the scenes’ to achieve desired outcomes or as 
enrolling other network members in line with one’s own objectives – be it by openly soliciting 
for the legitimacy of one’s own actions or rather in a ‘disguised form’ (i.e. the other members are 
not fully aware of acting in line with the other network member’s objectives, cf. also Exhibit 1). 
In any of these cases, leadership in interorganizational networks differs from leadership within 
organizations, since networks lack the possibility of directing the other via hierarchical fiat. In 
turn, this means that leadership in such networks always implies orienting, guiding and 
coordinating the activities of more or less independent and often similarly powerful 
organizations. This also implies that organizations, whatever the power differentials, influence 
each other reciprocally.  
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------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------- 
Table 2 offers an overview of relevant studies addressing leadership issues similar to our 
conception, although the terms used differ. Typically, these studies discuss hierarchical network 
settings where a powerful organization ‘orchestrates’ a number of network partners. For 
instance, Hinterhuber refers to orchestration as aligning the network partners’ competences to 
achieve superior performance while reverting to empirical evidence from the networks of 
Monsanto and DuPont. In a similar vein, Hung refers to mobilizing networks and shows how 
three Taiwanese computer firms – Acer, FIC and Mitac – achieve advantages over their 
competitors. The case of Mitac is particularly interesting for us, as Hung labels Mitac an 
ambidextrous player that is capable of skilfully using its relationships to other firms and 
networks. However, exactly how Mitac achieves this across networks is not set out in detail.  
Another prominent stream of research addresses how single organizations can govern 
networks. Common themes addressed here are issues of trust, risk and control. The scope of 
Nosella and Petroni’s research is probably the closest of the studies mentioned above. This is not 
only because they explicitly refer to the leadership of a single organization in different networks, 
but as they also offer closer insights into the way the four different networks overlap and how the 
lead firm is able to make use of synergies from being active in different networks. However, the 
study is not based upon a longitudinal analysis, which is why the dynamics of interorganizational 
leadership were not considered, an aspect the authors point out as interesting to study in future 
research. 
To sum up: in the literature on leadership in interorganizational networks, two issues that are 
relevant for the purposes of this study remain rather unexplored so far, but are essential for the 
concept and analysis of network manoeuvring when understood as a leadership practice that 
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makes use of membership in more than one (type of) network. First, it remains by and large 
unexplored how organizations exert leadership in heterarchical interorganizational networks. 
Second, and even more important for the notion of network manoeuvring, studies either adopt a 
more micro perspective when they concentrate on an isolated interorganizational network or 
employ a more macro-oriented lens when they take a portfolio approach20. Network 
manoeuvring as defined above is positioned in between these two perspectives or levels. Hence, 
we respond on the one hand to Nosella and Petroni, who point to the need to analyse leadership 
dynamics (here: network manoeuvring as a practice) and we also offer a response to Gulati’s call 
to venture beyond analysing single networks as a unit of analysis by taking the activities between 
networks into account. 
Finally, although in previous research some activities of organizations in networks have 
already been termed manoeuvring, the respective usage does not capture the essence of the 
phenomenon we are targeting, as these studies either make only fleeting reference to the term or 
do not consider interactions between or shifts across interorganizational networks21. Therefore 
we introduce network manoeuvring for the purposes of this study as taking advantage of being 
engaged in two different types of entities (here: networks), whereby it is possible to capitalize 
skilfully on a difference between these systems in the absence of hierarchical fiat. Manoeuvring 
in and across networks can take manifold forms and may be based not only on these differences, 
but also on superior financial assets or a well-established reputation. In more general terms, the 
respective organization is able to frame the conditions relevant for the respective network’s 
activities by facilitating, inhibiting or maintaining relationships and/or information flows, 
thereby effectively leveraging its impact by intertwining activities of different networks.  
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A structuration perspective on leadership practices 
Tracking network manoeuvring requires a theoretical perspective that allows us to capture how 
such leadership is actually enacted over time, which is why a process or practice perspective is 
necessary. This approach is in line with previous research that conceives of leadership not only 
as dynamic, but – in organizations and even more so in interorganizational networks – also as a 
complex, contested and diffuse phenomenon that cannot be captured at one point in time22. 
Structuration theory allows us to capture practices and how they are enacted in face of existing 
(here: heterarchical and hierarchical network) structures and the way that they contribute to the 
reproduction or transformation of these very structures over time; at the same time, allowing a 
multilevel analysis (here: the organizational and network levels). 
------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------- 
Perhaps even more importantly, structuration theory requires a multidimensional analysis. While 
most theories of networks deal with issues such as economics, power, sense-making, or the 
legitimacy in and of interorganizational networks, structuration theory follows the theorem of the 
duality of structure (cf. Figure 1), which emphasizes not only the recursive interplay between 
action and structure, but analytically differentiates the practically interrelated dimensions of 
signification, legitimation, and domination that address these issues. Actors refer to these 
structures – with regard to all three dimensions – on the level of the network as well as on other 
levels of analysis (e.g. the single organization) in their social practices, and (re)produce or 
transform them (and themselves) recursively.  
Moreover, following Giddens, structuration theory serves as a sensitizing device in its 
function as a grand theory, which can be augmented by diverse theoretical approaches relevant to 
the respective phenomenon at stake (in our case: leadership in different organizational forms). 
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Applying structuration theory to our context requires an analysis of leadership practices23 
whereby some network members more than others actually ‘make things happen’, first with 
regard to how they refer in their communications – via interpretive schemes – to rules of 
signification (e.g. ascribing relevance to a technological option in face-to-face communications). 
These rules – as structures – either prevail in the particular organization leading the network, in 
the interorganizational network, or in the industry in which the organizations and networks are 
acting. Thereby, they either (re)produce or transform these structures. The same can be said with 
respect to rules of legitimation: agents draw – by the use of norms – upon this kind of structure 
in the course of sanctioning behaviour (e.g. obtaining access to interorganizational resources 
related to a specific technology). With respect to resources of domination, agents refer to this 
third type of structure via facilities to powerfully intervene in ongoing interactions (e.g. by 
means of channelling financial resources or expertise to specific technological options). While 
this latter type of intervention seems to be particularly important for making things happen 
powerfully in networks, the duality of structure points to the fact that effective leadership 
interventions depend upon the subtle interplay of all three dimensions, i.e. that powerful 
interventions make sense to those ‘led’ and are hence considered as legitimate.  
The major advantage of structuration theory, beyond its multilevel and multidimensional 
approach, is that it helps to analyze interorganizational networks as recursively reproduced 
social practices and, thereby, focuses on the dynamics and dialectics inherent in this 
organizational form. For instance, a leadership practice that is not considered useful and 
legitimate by network participants might be questioned and trigger changes in the network 
constellation with regard to the leading organization, and can thus be captured adequately from a 
structuration perspective. Thus, not only changes in leadership over time can be analyzed, but 
contradictions can also be taken into account, e.g. de facto leading a network informally while it 
remains symbolically heterarchical in nature. Due to differences in abilities to revert to resources 
of domination and rules of signification and legitimation that cushion them, this holds true in 
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hierarchical networks more than in organizational hierarchies, and in heterarchical more than in 
hierarchical networks. In this respect too, structuration theory, which has already been applied to 
the analysis of different practices in organizations (e.g. by Denis and colleagues as well as 
Jarzabkowski), can be used to overcome many deficiencies found in the present analyses of 
interorganizational networks.  
 
Research setting and methodology 
The overall research setting is the semiconductor industry, which was chosen as a research object 
due to the relevance of interorganizational networks for this industry24. Recent developments 
serve to underscore the relevance of network arrangements to be found in this industry: current 
discussions on the part of U.S. automotive suppliers regarding the potential installation of a 
consortium modelled on SEMATECH are being held in an attempt to save the U.S. automotive 
supplier industry25.  
Within the semiconductor industry, our analysis concentrates upon Intel (short for Integrated 
Electronics Corporation), the world’s largest semiconductor company with an overall market 
share in the semiconductor industry of about 13%. The company’s concentration is on the 
microprocessor business, where its market share is unparalleled, currently nearly 80%26. In 
keeping with the objective of this paper, in order to analyze the activities of this network actor it 
is also important to turn to its membership in two different (types of) networks, SEMATECH, 
and the company’s impact on parts of its own supply chain regarding a specific technology. 
SEMATECH was established in 1987 as a nationally operating, pre-competitive, non-profit 
research and development network. According to Browning and Shetler, it needed consensus on 
its structure from all members and “freedom from internal domination” by a single organization. 
Although the term heterarchic network is not used officially by the consortium, it corresponds to 
our conception thereof, as the independent member organizations are linked to one another by 
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being not only enrolled at SEMATECH contractually but by interacting laterally, not least by 
utilizing the same pre-competitive testing facilities. The heterarchic character is also embodied in 
the ‘one member one vote rule’27. Therefore, decisions and allocations of the annual budget of 
approximately U.S. $ 140 million are consensual or, in the case of disagreements, favours are 
returned. The consortium is led by the so-called Executive Management Team (which consists of 
the Chief Executive Officer and President as well as three Vice Presidents) and cooperates 
closely with two other bodies, the Executive Steering Council on the overall directions of 
SEMATECH and the Board of Directors. Each of these three bodies is staffed by its member 
companies, who decide jointly about the annual budget. The diversity of activities into which the 
funding is channelled is predominantly ensured on an operative basis by around 100 assignees 
from all the member companies, who work on specific assignments that last for two to three 
years. The initial publicly funded purpose of SEMATECH was to regain the worldwide 
leadership position of U.S. chip manufacturers, who had lost market shares to their Japanese 
competitors in the 1980s. Public funding, however, ceased in 1996, when the U.S. semiconductor 
manufacturers regained their leading role on the worldwide market. From that time onwards, 
funding has been ensured entirely by member contributions or contract-based research. By the 
late 1990s, the consortium had also opened up to foreign companies, becoming known as 
International SEMATECH. Currently, the member organizations from the U.S. and South-East 
Asia are associated with one another by coordination of their joint research and development 
activities within SEMATECH while being formally enrolled at SEMATECH via member fees. 
Thirteen member organizations are private firms and the consortium includes one research 
institute. As the latter is a public institution, SEMATECH now (again) receives public funding. 
Taken together, these organizations dominate the semiconductor industry landscape, as its 
members represent around 50% of the worldwide production output in this sector.  
Intel’s influence within SEMATECH cannot be explained by financial data; Intel is not the 
most financially potent actor, as there are several other big corporations involved, e.g. IBM, 
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Hewlett Packard or Samsung. As previous studies like that of Browning and Shetler as well as 
our interviewees confirmed, no formally legitimated leadership-exerting organization presides 
over the consortium. In addition, the members pursue different technological options like 
extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV; e.g. Intel) and e-beam projection lithography (e.g. IBM), 
which is why the organizations are attempting to exert an influence concerning a limited range of 
network related activities, making SEMATECH even less centralized and network leadership 
potentially contested. It is striking that network leadership does not only vary with regard to 
technological options, but also over time. For instance, IBM was formerly the leading actor, 
whereby this changed increasingly to Intel over time. Furthermore, there was a transition period 
in between when various actors vied to lead the consortium’s activities. This held particularly 
true when no consensus was achieved regarding the next generation lithography sought for in the 
1990s (which led in the end to Intel’s rise as the leading organization; cf. Exhibit 1). Hence, we 
consider SEMATECH to be a heterarchical network in which partners are linked to one another 
on the basis of formal membership as well as by joint research and development activities that 
are repeatedly (re)negotiated, i.e. represent a form of collective strategizing as no member 
presides over the network. Moreover, the activities of SEMATECH tend to be, at least officially, 
taken in consensus among equal partners, not least to the ‘one member one vote’ rule.  
Our research setting also embraces companies of Intel’s supply chain with regard to 
semiconductor manufacturing system technologies (cf. Figure 2). Although Intel is inevitably 
involved in a number of interorganizational constellations, including a variety of supply chains 
when it comes to differing technological options or parts of microchips, the part of its supply 
chain we chose (i.e. the specific companies presented in the following) were labelled by 
interviewees as a single chain with regard to a specific technological option, EUV.  
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------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------- 
While Intel is not only by far in terms of revenues, employees etc. the most powerful firm of this 
supply chain, it is also acknowledged to be the key account company of the respective suppliers, 
creating a de facto dependence upon Intel, making this network highly centralized around Intel 
as the lead organization. What is more, Intel’s impact covers most almost all areas of the EUV 
related activities enduringly, which is why we deem it adequate to maintain that this part of the 
supply chain resembles a hierarchical network. We restrict our analysis to those companies 
consistently mentioned by interviewees as the most important to Intel in this regard, namely 
NaWoTec and Media Lario Technologies. NaWoTec (short for NAno WOrld TEChnologies) 
concentrates upon the development of mask repair systems, and since 2005 has been part of Carl 
Zeiss SMT AG, a German manufacturer of optical systems. Media Lario Technologies is one 
level below NaWoTec in the supply chain. The Italian company produces optical components 
that represent a critical component for NaWoTec in turn. 
Since we employ structuration theory to analyze leadership practices, we adopt an 
interpretative research methodology28 that allows us to capture the social practices that are at the 
centre of any structurationist inquiry. Such methodology is, moreover, most appropriate for 
exploring a phenomenon that is in need of further research. A longitudinal in-depth case study 
approach was chosen, as this allows us to generate novel insights concerning how leadership is 
enacted over time.  
Our data collection started in 2003 and, as part of an ongoing study of the way in which 
complex system technologies are extended and created by interorganizational networks, 
continued until October 2010. Apart from an initial data collection from secondary sources in the 
run-up to the project (e.g. non-scholarly publications), for triangulation purposes we utilized 
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archival data in order to reconstruct activities at SEMATECH and in the supply chain (e.g. 
publicly available brochures), 83 semi-structured interviews (on average: 60-90 minutes) as 
relevant sources for comprehending the activities within SEMATECH and the supply chain, as 
well as three panels consisting of five different experts, which have been held on an annual basis 
since 2007 in order to deepen our understanding of the semiconductor industry in general.  
In the course of data analysis we made use of a case study database to heighten reliability, 
comprising 150 pages of field notes, 1,493 pages of interview transcripts, and roughly triple the 
amount of archival data. We condensed these empirical data with the help of atlas.ti, software for 
encoding and analyzing qualitative data. Hereby, we constructed data-derived categories that 
were refined throughout the course of our analysis to researcher-induced (i.e. theoretical) 
categories, and grouped them hierarchically. For construct validity purposes, the analytical 
themes were reviewed by key informants in the course of re-entering the field parallel to the 
three stages. By means of continuing to conduct focused interviews throughout the data analysis 
phase, ambiguities in our comprehension of roadmapping and roadmap gap filling were resolved. 
We only present those findings where consensus was reached between our interpretations and the 
perspectives of the respondents (further details about our method can be found in the Appendix). 
 
Enacting network leadership by influencing roadmaps 
Drawing from our empirical data, we present the enactment of leadership in the heterarchical and 
hierarchical networks as being constituted by a set of social practices significantly influenced – 
but not entirely determined – by Intel, and formulate propositions to condense the findings that 
advance our understanding of network manoeuvring as a particular leadership practice. Focusing 
upon practices is in line with recently renewed calls by Jarzabkowski and others for more 
practice-based theorizing, usefully grounded in structuration theory. We identify two leadership 
practices that deserve special attention in connection with network manoeuvring in and across 
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the two types of networks: roadmapping as a form of agenda building, as well as roadmap gap 
filling. Each leadership practice consists of a set of micro-practices that are not mutually 
exclusive but still distinct from each other, making up the respective practice which they 
constitute (Figure 3).  
The first practice, roadmapping, represents an industry-wide effort to (re)produce an overall 
orientation for the industry’s product and technology development efforts by means of the so-
called International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors, in short ITRS29. This practice is 
particularly related to SEMATECH, i.e. how leadership is exerted by Intel within SEMATECH 
as a heterarchical network.  
------------------------ 
Figure 3 about here 
----------------------- 
Apart from this, Intel’s impact can also be perceived in a very tangible fashion in the hierarchical 
network, that is, in the course of investing large sums into critical organizations along parts of its 
supply chain. This second practice was perceived to be the most critical practice according to our 
interviewees and we have termed it roadmap gap filling, adopted in vivo from our interviews. 
These two practices mutually inform each other. This is worth noting (see again Figure 3), as 
it allows Intel to strengthen its influence in both (types of) networks. Intel plays a critical role in 
the formulation and execution of both networks’ agendas as well as in the accompanying pursuit 
of technological options and, even more importantly, in the network manoeuvring not only 
within but also across both (types of) networks. 
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Roadmapping as a heterarchical network leadership practice  
The continuation of the cooperation among SEMATECH members is ensured by a variety of 
activities, among them the issuing of an industry-wide agenda, the ITRS, as well as a number of 
workshops and conferences. As no company is committed to all the fields that SEMATECH is 
active in, no one aspires to a leading position in all fields. Nevertheless, as we will set out 
subsequently, Intel is able to manoeuvre its impact regarding those technological options which 
it favours. 
For the semiconductor industry, so-called technological roadmaps are an important technique 
by which to foster the long-term planning of technological paths or trajectories. Often, these 
technological roadmaps are not only documented in writing, but contain graphical elements for 
the exploration and communication of the relationships between evolving and developing 
products and technologies – and markets – over time. Our case confirms the centrality of 
roadmaps in these coordinative respects; the ITRS is a decisive tool, as it is issued by a 
SEMATECH-affiliated organization. Furthermore, this roadmap is commonly considered to be 
the most important one of the semiconductor industry. Hence, it is not surprising that our 
interviewees also consistently referred to the ITRS as the roadmap in the industry; it has emerged 
as a practice for building a collaborative agenda, originally on a national level, and since 1999 on 
a global level. The ITRS represents a practice insofar as it is regularly updated, usually every 
two years, with a few official updates in between. It is the coordinative process, “it is 
‘roadmapping’ rather than ‘the roadmap’ that generates value”30. Bearing these notions in mind, 
it seems plausible to argue that the ITRS serves as a coordinating device for the semiconductor 
industry as a whole: 
“The objective of the ITRS is to ensure cost-effective advancements in the performance of the 
integrated circuit and the products that employ such devices, thereby continuing the health and 
success of this industry […] joining with other strategic roadmapping efforts […] so the Roadmap 
effort comprehends the spectrum of needs for basic research capabilities and product potentials.”31  
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For this paper it is worth noting that most interviewees refer to the ITRS as a jointly produced 
artefact that is not dominated by selected organizations, an aspect that is also stressed in the 
official proclamations of the ITRS. However, some companies – not only Intel, but as we will 
show predominantly Intel – are more equal than others. In order to pursue its own corporate 
objectives, and maintain a leadership position within SEMATECH and beyond, our interviewees 
consistently and regardless of their affiliation aired the opinion that Intel attempts to exert an 
enduring influence upon the ITRS, by nature in particular with regard to those technological 
options it favours. In this regard we identified a set of three key micro-practices that in effect 
contribute substantially to roadmapping – politicking, partnering and consensus-building – and 
which we will introduce illustratively against the backdrop of the three dimensions of 
signification, domination and legitimation.  
------------------------- 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------- 
As Intel cannot directly determine the ITRS, it attempts to exert influence by more or less subtly 
shaping the overall rules of signification and legitimation involved in roadmap creation and 
alteration, and by coordinating the usages of resources (see Figure 4). Bearing this in mind and 
focussing on network leadership – via roadmapping as a social practice of constructing an 
industry-wide orientation – the ITRS can be interpreted in terms of rules of signification in the 
following way: the relevant actors of the semiconductor industry relate their activities to the 
ITRS via sense-making activities, which is why they “watch out for homogeneity” as one 
interviewee put it, an aspect Intel attempts to influence by politicking. This practice serves to 
influence the way actors assess technological options found in the ITRS in favour of those 
options Intel pursues. Reverting to our observations in particular when visiting conferences, Intel 
tries to gain momentum for its technological options like EUV by disseminating official 
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information in the form of press releases immediately before or in the course of these venues or 
keynote presentations. Circulating this information represents an “opportunistic instrument” (I-
21) as Intel is aware of attracting the attention of fellow network and industry members. These 
official announcements are flanked, according to our participation at such venues, by a massive 
presence of Intel employees at these locales. Checking rooster listings, Intel representatives 
frequently compose the majority of attendees per organization. This finding is noteworthy 
insofar as we are able to observe that the “carefully placed clues” of announcements as one 
interviewee put it (I-92), will be substantiated and supported by “hallway conversations” (I-32), 
whereby Intel representatives reinforce the messages communicated officially in the course of 
coffee breaks or in meeting rooms attached to the main halls. 
As the ITRS represents the aggregated general assumptions and viewpoints of the industry – 
collected, compiled, extrapolated and adjusted by and to the members of SEMATECH – this 
practice is very effective. The reason is that those technological options that are referred to in the 
ITRS are likely to attract more resources than alternative technological options. Hence, offering 
an orientation by politicking represents a way of exerting leadership indirectly by trying to 
influence the content – and the sense-making of the content – of the ITRS with regard to 
technological options like EUV, i.e. not to the whole ITRS.  
A pooling or re-pooling of resources can be understood, from a structuration perspective at 
least, as (re-)configuring structure on the social dimension of domination, on the basis of which 
power can be and actually is exercised in day-to-day interactions. This can be illustrated by the 
practice of partnering, understood here as selectively engaging with organizations to gain 
momentum for one’s own corporate objectives. This practice ensues from utilizing the ITRS as a 
reference basis when deciding to cooperate within SEMATECH and beyond to pursue joint 
technological options. As pointed out for the case of the EUV LLC consortium (cf. Exhibit 1), 
partnering with fellow SEMATECH members and other organizations from the semiconductor 
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industry served to prove the viability of EUV when no consensus was reached among 
SEMATECH members. However, proving the viability of EUV made EUV the favoured 
technological option on the ITRS, leading to massive financial resources being channelled into 
EUV. 
This powerful intervention is also closely intertwined with the legitimation of Intel’s 
leadership activities ensuing from the ITRS. Due to the fact that the ITRS signifies what is worth 
pursuing, it legitimizes the resources that are mobilized for developing one particular 
technological option. To put it differently: it is considered as legitimate in the semiconductor 
industry to relate to the ITRS in order to label a technological option as being viable or 
preferable, even if some actors like Intel have influenced its prioritization to a greater extent than 
other organizations. Legitimation of the ITRS is even ensured by the fact that it is laid out by all 
relevant actors of the industry, in particular the big chip manufacturers like Intel, Samsung or 
Motorola. In this connection, Intel pays particular attention to consensus-building. This micro-
practice is particularly powerful if employed successfully, as our interviewees confirmed 
consistently that its impact is augmented due to the assumed impartiality of the roadmap. For 
instance, when visiting a large scale SEMATECH hosted conference, a senior member of the 
consortium who is an Intel assignee to SEMATECH presented the results of a survey that was 
distributed among all organizations concerning the viability of the technological options 
SEMATECH and its members are likely to pursue at the end of an exclusive dinner on the final 
evening of the venue. In this connection, it was striking that not all results were interpreted in 
line with what the presenter announced, as several attendees started to grumble at some 
interpretations provided that they did not share. Asked about their opinion in this informal 
setting, an attendee aired that it is “impressive how the survey results are interpreted to foster 
EUV”, i.e. the technological option, among others, which Intel favours and accordingly ought to 
be pursued by SEMATECH. As a result, the pooling of resources and lending of significance and 
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legitimation fosters the overarching objectives of the roadmap, as well as Intel’s own corporate 
goals.  
 
Roadmap gap filling as a hierarchical network leadership practice 
One important practice for Intel that is directly related to the practice of roadmapping is roadmap 
gap filling. This terminus can be traced back to Intel’s engagement as a technology and market 
leader in the semiconductor industry, which repeatedly supports critical suppliers to ensure 
operations along its own (as well as SEMATECH’s) supply chain with regard to those 
technological options that it favours. In what follows we illustrate a set of three key micro-
practices, identified throughout our analysis, which constitute roadmap gap filling: financing, 
providing technical expertise and signalling. 
Roadmap gap filling, studied here as a leadership practice, relates to specific gaps detected in 
the ITRS and qualified as ‘critical’ for the development of the complex system manufacturing 
technology. Intel Capital, Intel’s corporate venture capital entity, plays a central role in the 
subset of network organizations that ‘motivates’ the specific supplier (or sometimes sub-
suppliers) to undertake the risky endeavour of concentrating on activities to produce a particular 
technological solution, i.e. one which fills the respective gap. For instance, both NaWoTec and 
Media Lario Technologies have been the target of Intel Capital’s investments, as they are indeed 
critical members of Intel’s supply chain regarding EUV. In both cases, financial support was 
granted by Intel Capital and other venture capital firms were indirectly motivated and directly 
mobilized to follow suit. Hereby, it was possible to fill the roadmap gaps of Intel’s own 
roadmap, which is informed by and aligned with the ITRS. By supporting suppliers to fill the 
roadmap gaps, Intel affects the (re)production of these practices in turn. Although Intel Capital 
closely collaborates with other actors from the venture capital industry in most cases of roadmap 
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gap filling, our interview partners ascribe a major role to Intel Capital in supporting the supplier 
organizations.  
The basic principle inscribed in the ITRS is still Moore’s law32, which pinpoints the doubling 
of transistors on microchips every two years under conditions of stable costs. In order to fulfil 
this so-called ‘law’ in the future, there is a widely shared need for a new technology that 
succeeds in manufacturing microchips by means of post-optical lithography. At the moment, 
EUV is considered the most likely candidate for this system technology. Since the system 
technology is too complex and based on too many diverse bodies of knowledge to be developed 
by a single company, the industry is looking for coordinated activities to solve the massive 
coordination problem involved in producing a next-generation technology for chip 
manufacturing. Intel is ascribed and actively takes up a ‘guiding function’ for the whole industry 
in this endeavour for two reasons. First, investments by Intel via Intel Capital are commonly 
perceived as a strong signal that the respective potential deal – and technology – might be worth 
pursuing. Second, Intel’s venture capital arm operates as a separate entity that disposes of a large 
amount of financial resources from which Intel can draw in order to exert power.  
------------------------- 
Figure 5 about here 
------------------------- 
The different aspects of this crucial leadership practice can be highlighted through the lens of 
structuration theory as shown in Figure 5. The rules of signification are identifiable concerning 
the practice of signalling, comprehended here as directing the attention of SEMATECH and 
industry members towards Intel’s, or rather, Intel Capital’s activities along its supply chain. Thus 
when industry actors relate their activities to Intel’s roadmap gap filling, they attach importance 
to Intel’s activities. Moreover, the targets of Intel’s investments (e.g. NaWoTec or Media Lario 
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Technologies) are also aware of signalling. This is highlighted by the former top manager of 
Media Lario Technologies, who put it succinctly as follows: 
“[On the one hand,] Intel Capital itself was as important as any other VC [venture 
capitalist]. But on the other hand, with Intel Capital came “Mama Intel” if you like […] so Intel 
Capital was no more and no less a very capable entity like the other VCs. The bonus point was 
that there was Intel interest behind it” (I-41)  
In accordance with such ascriptions, Intel Capital was consistently identified by our interviewees 
as being the most influential and – with regard to financial resources, technological expertise, 
and its ability to shape its supply chain – by far the best endowed and most experienced actor of 
its kind in the whole industry, which underscores Intel’s signalling practice.  
Concerning the resources of domination, we revert to the practice of financing, understood as 
providing financial resources needed to pursue a technological option – as follows: the process 
of roadmap gap filling is utilized by Intel in order to allocate financial resources in the form of 
equity as an allocative resource to suppliers like Media Lario Technology or NaWoTec that 
develop technological options in line with its own corporate objectives. As a result, Intel is able 
to exert power and influence in the course of interacting with other organizations while the 
practice of roadmap gap filling is utilized for the distribution of allocative and authoritative 
resources. Therefore, European suppliers such as the Italian-based Media Lario Technologies are 
enabled to pursue aggressively the development of EUV components – and EUV is the next 
generation lithography technology Intel prefers. Without these investments, the company would 
simply not be able to pursue these objectives – and, in turn, not be in a position to fill the 
roadmap gap for Intel and possibly the whole industry. Hereby, authoritative resources are used 
to exert power insofar as Intel Capital influences decisions about the use of the invested capital 
by its participation in the firm’s supervisory board, as this implies an influence upon the overall 
strategy of the company.  
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When analyzing the practice of roadmap gap filling as a leadership practice, rules of 
legitimation become evident in the form of providing technological expertise and, thereby, 
influencing how things happen in the network. We observe this practice when Intel Capital 
supports the development of its portfolio companies by contributing technological expertise and 
access to other crucial members of the EUV supply chain. This activity is pursued by providing 
key personnel and critical know-how as well as legal advice or licenses/patents. This is of vital 
importance for the development of components in line with required specifications and, thus, 
enabling the overall supply chain to work efficiently. Apart from this, Intel also trains employees 
from the companies with regard to social skills and technical expertise. This has an enabling 
character, as it offers new business and collaboration opportunities. Hereby, members of the 
supply chain are enticed to cooperate with the Intel Capital-backed suppliers.  
 
Interconnected roadmapping allowing for network manoeuvring  
Having introduced the two practices of roadmapping and roadmap gap filling influenced by and 
aiming at the network level, we suggest in line with structuration theory that these two practices 
are closely and recursively interrelated, insofar as they represent social practices that (re)produce 
the informally enacted leadership position of Intel in both networks. What is more, the inter-
connectedness of these practices and the set of practices that constitute them is an outcome as 
well as a means of network manoeuvring in both types of networks, heterarchical and 
hierarchical. This is illustrated by Intel’s diverse attempts to influence the agenda-setting via 
roadmaps, as well as the interorganizational practice of roadmap gap filling. 
Based upon our findings, we derive more general and more specific conclusions (ensuing 
from the set of practices constituting roadmapping and roadmap gap filling) regarding the inter-
connection between roadmapping and roadmap gap filling, emerging from and contributing to 
the (re)production of a heterarchical and a hierarchical network respectively. This can be grasped 
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in terms of their mutual interplay over time, as both practices (re)inform each other (cf. again 
Figure 3). As Intel exerts an innate impact upon the formulation of the industry-wide ITRS, i.e. 
depending on which technological option or path is likely to be pursued by means of politicking, 
partnering and consensus-building, it influences the activities, i.e. makes things happen, within 
SEMATECH as a heterarchical network. As a result, roadmapping within SEMATECH has an 
influence upon Intel’s supply chain, since roadmap gap filling – constituted by signalling, 
financing and providing technological expertise – is informed by roadmapping, i.e. the ITRS. As 
illustrated for the case of roadmapping against the backdrop of SEMATECH, we submit that this 
consensus-based and informally accepted network leadership points to heterarchy-based network 
manoeuvring, resulting in the following 
Proposition 1: Leading de facto a heterarchical network enhances the possibilities for a focal 
organization to lead a hierarchical network. 
Conversely, the same holds true as Intel’s roadmap gap filling activities have an impact upon the 
state of development or even overall success of the technological options preferred by Intel. This 
in turn strengthens the impact Intel can exert on the ITRS board when it comes to promoting the 
respective technological options. As illustrated for the case of Intel’s roadmap gap filling, we 
suggest that this specific occurrence of network leadership reflects hierarchy-based network 
manoeuvring, leading to the following 
Proposition 2: Leading a hierarchical network empowers an organization to lead de facto a 
heterarchical network. 
Taken together, both practices revert to the same form of artefact (i.e. a roadmap), albeit there 
are differences: in their articulation (a consensus document vs. a solely Intel initiated document), 
timing (long-term oriented vs. rather short-term oriented along the supply chain), deployment (de 
facto industry wide emanating from SEMATECH vs. oriented along the supply chain), and in 
particular with regard to the capabilities required (negotiation skills for political manoeuvres vs. 
   
27 
calculating risks of investments and attracting fellow investors). However, we suggest that 
propositions 1 and 2 can be combined to develop proposition 3, as both processes, roadmapping 
and roadmap gap filling, reinform and eventually even reinforce each other recursively, helping 
Intel to lead different networks effectively over time: 
Proposition 3: Hierarchy- and heterarchy-based manoeuvring are likely to mutually reinforce 
each other if interconnected practices based on a resource relevant for manoeuvring in both 
network forms is considered meaningful and legitimate. 
 
Implications  
Managerial implications – the practice of roadmapping as a substitute for formally 
legitimated leadership  
Although this research concentrated upon a single case study in one specific industry, we are 
able to provide some conclusions that are valuable for managers concerned with managing inter-
organizational networks in general (cf. Figure 6).  
----------------------- 
Figure 6 about here 
----------------------- 
First of all, when it comes to heterarchical network structures, the lack of formally legitimated 
leadership can be compensated for by leadership practices that are adapted to the specific 
circumstances. In more detail, it is then important to strive for a factual leadership that is 
informally accepted, among others, due to the consensus-based nature of the mechanisms. Herein 
we confirm previous findings of Dyer and colleagues regarding supplier networks where similar 
mechanisms and partner specific activities have been identified, e.g. providing technical 
expertise. This may be the case either because others perceive a leadership vacuum or accept the 
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factual leadership, e.g. as is the case with Intel, in face of a record of having an innovative 
reputation or disposing of a renowned venture capital entity that, in collaboration with other 
partners, is able to develop momentum in favour of certain technological options.  
Second, our findings indicate that a company is likely to benefit from reflecting upon its own 
embeddedness into different network contexts, in particular beyond the immediate single network 
scope within which it attempts to achieve certain objectives. Relating to previous research on 
alliance portfolios, we suggest that various phenomena of these wider contexts ought to be taken 
into consideration, e.g. the formulation and pursuit of objectives formulated within technological 
roadmaps or other joint activities that are pursued by a wide range of industry participants, not 
only by those stemming from the focal – in this case heterarchical – network. Another 
consensus-based phenomenon fostering networking and therefore worth considering might be 
conferences where actors from the respective industry meet and exchange ideas. In our case, this 
concerns venues like SPIE conferences. At this convention, all the important actors interested in 
lithography convene annually and exchange their ideas. Similar to the practice of roadmapping, 
Intel is able to exert an influence upon the agendas of these conferences. Taken together, we 
deem it important to take such leadership practices into consideration, as this might help 
managers to think of leadership as an ‘outside-inside’-mechanism as well; that is, influencing 
artefacts (e.g. the formulation of the ITRS) or arenas (e.g. setting themes in the course of 
conferences) ‘outside’ of the network in order to accomplish objectives ‘inside’ the respective 
network. 
Third, manoeuvring between various networks seems to be worth taking into account as well, 
in particular between different types of networks. Our research suggests that by means of 
(partially) aligning Intel’s internal supply chain-related roadmap with the industry-wide ITRS, 
Intel is able to derive benefits from the pursuit of both roadmaps that are intertwined with regard 
to the company’s activities of manoeuvring an impact between both network forms. We infer this 
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from our examination of Intel’s various activities to pursue the respective intermediate objectives 
(milestones) of both roadmaps, which are often interrelated. For instance, objectives formulated 
in the ITRS appear to inform Intel’s internal supply chain-related roadmap, which results in the 
ensuing roadmap gap filling activities like the support of NaWoTec and Media Lario 
Technologies with expert training and financial resources. According to our interviewees, filling 
these gaps, in turn, strengthens Intel’s authority within SEMATECH when it comes to 
formulating the upcoming ITRS. Given this observation, firms ought to attempt to relate their 
practices in different networks to one another reflexively in order to derive benefits from 
manoeuvring between these networks.  
Theoretical implications – Network manoeuvring as a leadership practice  
Based upon our findings from both types of network that Intel is engaged in, we are able to draw 
the following theoretical implications – despite the limited generalizeability usually resulting 
from a single in-depth case study design. As for the differentiation between hierarchy and 
heterarchy, we refine Hedlund’s concept that highlights the often rather loose internal structure 
of multinational corporations and adapt it to the interorganizational network context. This author 
views heterarchical forms of organizing as advantageous by comparison to hierarchical forms. 
This assumption can be traced back to the (potential) benefits of heterarchical structures, i.e. an 
improved dissemination of knowledge, trust as a form of normative integration among equal 
partners, a participatory and at the same time consensus-oriented form of finding solutions, and 
the emergence of temporary leadership due to superior performance or expertise.  
Transferring Hedlund’s ideas to the realm of interorganizational networks leads to the 
presumption that leadership in heterarchical networks is – as opposed to formally legitimacy-
based leadership in hierarchical networks – de facto informal, though based on the social 
acceptance of one or more actors as leadership-exerting entities by the network members. This 
acceptance is likely to stem not only from activities inside, but also outside of the focal network. 
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Hence it seems worthwhile in studies of network leadership to consider the (possibly also 
networked) context that the network to be led is embedded in – including other (types of) 
networks. This is in line with the more structurally oriented discourse on alliance portfolios. 
However, our findings are more fine-grained, focusing upon practices and micro-practices 
between two different network forms and over time. 
In contrast to hierarchical networks, heterarchical ones are less centralized, i.e. more 
polycentric in nature. One consequence of this property is that in heterarchical networks 
decisions and other types of action are more frequently subject to negotiations; as are, for 
instance, the decisions over SEMATECH budgets that are made on a quid pro quo basis. In 
addition, while the scope of activities in hierarchical networks usually comprises all network-
related activities, leadership in or of a heterarchical network is more likely to be distributed 
among the members. Illustrative evidence supporting this conception in an interorganizational 
context is also offered by Mortehan33, who reports on distributed technological leadership in the 
information technology industry. This more distributed character of network leadership would 
have to be taken into account as well when theorizing network leadership in general and network 
manoeuvring in particular.  
Moreover, in contrast to previous studies that concentrate upon leading not only hierarchical, 
but also single, isolated networks, we broaden the scope of analysis by introducing the very 
notion of network manoeuvring; that is, we refine approaches geared towards network structures 
while acknowledging the intertwined nature of enacting leadership in different or even diverse 
interorganizational networks – manifest in our case around the artefact-based practice of 
roadmapping concerning two interrelated roadmaps in two types of networks. As a result, 
research on leadership in interorganizational networks might be worth reconsidering, taking the 
aspect of manoeuvring intentionally by competent and reflexive actors in and across several 
networks into account as a ‘network-transcending’ practice. 




This paper’s objective was to elucidate how and under what circumstances Intel is able to exert 
leadership within SEMATECH as a heterarchical network. The most important insight of this 
study is that ultimately Intel is only able to lead such a network because it is able to capitalize on 
its position in another (type of) network: its hierarchical supply chain. We conceptualize this 
leadership practice as network manoeuvring which is pursued by means of two intertwining 
leadership practices, roadmapping and roadmap gap filling, both centred on roadmaps as 
artefacts yet targeted at the heterarchical and the hierarchical network respectively and each 
consisting of a set of practices that constitute roadmapping and roadmap gap filling respectively. 
Whereas organizations in hierarchical networks are equally unable to revert to fiat (at least not to 
the same extent as in intraorganizational constellations), leadership in heterarchical networks is 
even more dependent upon such alternative opportunities to make things happen based upon 
resources of domination and in line with rules of signification and legitimation.  
Future studies might consider broadening the empirical and methodological scope of our 
analysis. For instance, apart from analyzing larger empirical samples, it might be intriguing to 
analyse the participants that influence the ITRS by means of social network analytical tools. If 
applied for gathering longitudinal data, this might help us to complement our understanding of 
these leadership practices against the background of more detailed structural information, e.g. 
with regard to the participating organizations or industry experts in order to illuminate research-
related interorganizational connections. What is more, roadmapping is a specific, knowledge 
intensive process in a science-based industry. For example, observing project-based arenas in the 
film or construction industry or alternatively service-oriented interorganizational networks might 
result in different forms and patterns of network manoeuvring, fostering our comprehension of 
the differences between research contexts.  




A longitudinal in-depth case study approach was chosen in order to comprehend the way Intel 
Corporation is able to lead a heterarchical network like SEMATECH over time. Employing 
structuration theory as a constructivist methodology that allows us to capture the social practice 
of network manoeuvring makes such an approach even more appropriate, as network 
manoeuvring represents a phenomenon that is in need of further research and is difficult to 
capture by means of deductive forms of analysis.  
Data sources 
The empirical research process started in November 2003 and, as part of an ongoing study of the 
way in which complex system technologies are extended and created by interorganizational 
networks, was continued up until October 2010. Apart from an initial data collection from 
secondary sources in the run-up to the project (e.g. non-scholarly publications), three main 
sources were utilized for triangulation purposes at regular intervals throughout the course of the 
project in order to heighten construct validity and avoid respondent bias.  
First, we consulted a broad range of archival data in order to reconstruct activities at 
SEMATECH and in the supply chain. This data included online material (e.g. publicly available 
brochures, annual reports), material from internal archives or, alternatively, newspaper and 
journal articles. 
Secondly, we conducted 83 semi-structured interviews (on average: 60-90 minutes) on- and 
offsite with respondents from SEMATECH, its members, and other experts identified as relevant 
sources for comprehending the activities within SEMATECH and the supply chain and the 
semiconductor industry more generally (see Table 3). In order to limit biases, we chose 
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respondents from various levels and regions, as well as from differing professional backgrounds, 
namely industry experts, members of political institutions, and fellow researchers.  
------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------- 
Thirdly, three panels have been held on an annual basis since 2007 in order to deepen our 
understanding of the semiconductor industry in general (see Table 4). Five experts were selected 
for the panel, all of whom have different organizational and professional backgrounds and in-
depth insights into the technology development process. The panel interviews were timed so that 
they followed the SPIE conference, one of the most important venues for organizational actors 
relevant to this paper. 
Each expert interview – and, in a slightly modified fashion, the panel interviews as well – was 
oriented towards an interview guideline that consisted of a series of open-ended questions, 
augmented by follow-up and clarifying questions. The interviews were divided into four central 
themes that aimed to solicit exploratory information about the way SEMATECH or parts of the 
supply chain are governed. In particular, the four central themes addressed were: (1) The way 
interactions within SEMATECH / the supply chain are set up formally, (2) who the dominating 
actors are, (3) what happens in the case of disagreements, and finally (4) what informal 
mechanisms can be observed and are utilized to exert an influence within SEMATECH / along 
the supply chain. 
------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
------------------------- 
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Finally, we conducted follow-up interviews, two seminars and e-mail correspondence with 
key respondents and discussions with researchers from the fields of organizational sociology and 
strategic management research, as well as industry respondents as a form of member validation. 
This allowed us to strengthen our line of reasoning as we integrated their valuable remarks. 
Moreover, we participated at conference venues and engaged in informal conversations at these 
occasions to back our impressions or modify them subsequently. 
Data analysis 
A qualitative content analysis of the empirical data was performed in order to reconstruct the 
subjective perspectives of the interviewees toward our study’s objective. Although our data 
analysis did not occur in a linear fashion, it can be roughly divided into the following three 
stages: in the first stage we collected all data in a case study database to heighten reliability, 
whereby our analysis is based upon the ‘raw data’ of 150 pages of field notes, 1,493 pages of 
interview transcripts, and roughly triple the amount of archival data (including media coverage, 
both by online journals and trade periodicals via LexisNexis database, English language edition). 
Written comments and reports on the diverse organizations involved and the practices pursued 
were compiled and initially systematized in order to obtain an overview. Furthermore, cyclical 
rereading and protocols by the authors formed the basis for comprehending the way Intel 
engages in both practices.  
Stage two consisted of writing up condensed descriptions of how Intel and the different 
organizations and networks interact. The resulting detailed descriptions were discussed by the 
research team and this sensitized us to the way in which Intel manoeuvres in both networks. 
Throughout the course of this, roadmapping and roadmap gap filling became manifest as the 
decisive practices concerning both networks.  
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------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
-------------------------------- 
In stage three we condensed our empirical data. For this purpose we converted all ‘raw data’ 
into PDF-files for a combined analysis in atlas.ti, software for analyzing qualitative data. Figure 
7 depicts the emergent data structure, which started with coding at the level of a text unit, 
defined as a sentence or sequence of sentences conveying a coherent point. Initial coding 
resulted in 35 first-order categories offered in vivo by informants. At first, some text units were 
placed in multiple categories to allow for a rich interpretation of data. In what followed we 
constructed mutually exclusive second-order themes and grouped them hierarchically, which led 
to the collapse of first-order categories into second-order themes that represent more abstract and 
researcher-induced interpretations. For instance, we collected all annually edited ITRS 
documents (complete ‘ITRS Editions’ have been released each odd-numbered year since 1997 
and corrections have been released in ‘ITRS Updates’ each even-numbered year since 1998) and 
realized that they emphasize that its output is based upon the “continued consensus of 
semiconductor experts”. Hence, the technological challenges SEMATECH or even the 
semiconductor industry per se ought to pursue as most critical are based upon a joint 
understanding or collective sense-making of where the industry is (supposed to be) heading. 
Thereafter, the second-order themes were subsumed under the two third-order themes that 
represent the two practices most relevant for manoeuvring between different networks as an 
overarching concept. 
For construct validity purposes, the analytical themes were reviewed by key informants in the 
course of re-entering the field parallel to the three stages. By means of conducting focused 
interviews, ambiguities in our comprehension of roadmapping and roadmap gap filling were 
resolved. When network manoeuvring – consisting of roadmapping and roadmap gap filling – 
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clarified an overarching analytical concept, we compared our results with previous research on 
leadership in networks and roadmaps to highlight similarities (e.g. the questionable nature of the 
hard and unbiased facts represented in the roadmap as an artefact) and differences (e.g. 
congregating), which strengthened the internal validity of our findings and served to match data 
and theory. 
----------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
------------------------ 
Table 5 provides data samples, providing illustrations of the overarching structuration 
theoretical dimensions of signification, domination and legitimation that the interviewees 
reverted to in the course of our interviews. Moreover, Table 6 shows examples from different 
sources, from which we identified and verified the theme of roadmapping. It is worth noting that 
only those perspectives were integrated that were shared by interviewees with differing types of 
occupation and hierarchical levels in order to strengthen the internal validity of our claims.  
------------------------- 
Table 6 about here 
------------------------- 
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Table 1: Bipolar continuum of leadership in interorganizational networks. 
 
criteria / type of network  
leadership hierarchical heterarchical
distribution of power asymmetric symmetric
decision making authority-based consensus-based
initiation of leadership related 
activities
hierarchically imposed actor initiated
nature of leadership formally legitimated informal, socially accepted
degree of formal centralization high low
scope of centralization monocentric polycentric
scope of activities whole range of network-related 
activities
whole or limited range of network-
related activities





Exhibit 1. Supporting a technological option by means of engaging fellow industry actors 
In 1997 Intel initiated the EUV Limited Liability Company (LLC) to prove the viability of extreme ultraviolet 
lithography (EUV), one of the post-optical solutions that the whole semiconductor industry and in particular 
its prime research and development consortium, SEMATECH, were trying to identify. When the members of 
SEMATECH did not reach a consensus about which technological option ought to be pursued as a next 
generation lithography by the consortium, Intel – favoring EUV and supporting it with massive financial 
investments and expertise since 1995 – skillfully persuaded some other SEMATECH members, as well as 
further important actors like the U.S. Department of Energy related Lawrence and Livermore National 
Laboratories to join their quest. When the main problematic issues were resolved in the first three years, two 
more manufacturers, Micron and Infineon, joined the consortium, adding know-how and financial support. A 
year later in 2001 IBM joined as well, adding further momentum to the effort, although they had been 
pursuing a competing technological option beforehand as well. These efforts signified that this technological 
option is likely to be the most successful candidate for a next generation technology, augmenting the 
prospects for additional resources, which in turn increased industry-wide attention.
When the EUV LLC successfully proved the viability of EUV in 2001, this had enormous implications, 
improving the legitimacy to pursue this specific technological option and culminating in an even closer 
collaboration between several SEMATECH members under the auspices of Intel. Intel’s decision to invest in 
the EUV LLC and its announcement that the consortium will have the task of delivering the proof of principle 
for EUV also influenced many investment decisions made by other SEMATECH and other semiconductor 
industry members. Thereafter, SEMATECH assessed EUV as one of the main technological options to follow; 
which is why Intel de facto had massive influence on the development of this technological option.
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Table 2: Previous empirically grounded studies on leadership in interorganizational networks. 
Conception of leadership with regard to 
interorganizational networks Previous research examples Key insights Issues that need further exploration
Leading / guiding Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 
(1995), Nosella and Petroni 
(2007)
Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller highlight the importance 
of creating value as a critical task for the respective 
"strategic center"; among others, by means of 
sharing information and resources within a single 
network. Nosella and Petroni point out that being 
able to manage different networks successfully 
results in superior performance of the whole system 
of networks, whereby the authors also elucidate how 
the lead organization can make use of synergies 
resulting from the interactions between networks; 
conveying a coherent vision and introducing a 
cooperative culture supplementing formal 
coordination mechanisms are deemed decisive
The way the lead company can benefit from the different 
networks in terms of interactions between these different 
types of networks remains unexplored in both studies. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the network is not captured 
on a longitudinal basis.
Leveraging Capaldo (2007), Lorenzoni 
and Lipparini (1999)
Leveraging is perceived as a capability residing in an 
organization to make use of different network 
partners over time
Taking advantage of two (or more) different networks is 
not considered while the studies concentrate upon 
isolated accounts of different networks
Orchestrating Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006), 
Hinterhuber (2002)
Orchestration is related to a dominant actor or hub 
firm that directs the activities of the different 
networks
This literature concentrates upon a single network at the 
expense of interactions and activities situated between 
networks. In addition, in both cases hierarchical networks 
are led by a dominant firm
Mobilising Hung (2002) Mobilising networks is conceived to be a means of 
improving the overall performance of the lead firm to 
achieve strategic difference; based upon a resource-
dependence perspective, the analysis of three 
Taiwanese networks highlights the importance of 
considering the networks' embeddedness with 
regard to different forms of external relationships
Though different networks are analyzed, they represent 
distinctive networks, i.e. each of the three cases is 
presented individually. Therefore, in this study as well, it 
remains unexplored how a lead firm can take advantage 
of participating in two different networks
Coordinating Hoffmann (2005), Huemer 
(2006)
Both studies explore the coordination of a network, 
whereby in particular with regard to the study of 
Hoffmann a more macro approach is adopted, that 
is, a portfolio of dyadic ties and alliances is 
considered 
Interactions between different networks are only 
mentioned fleetingly and it remains unclear how a lead 
firm can take advantage of being active in different 
networks
Governing de Man and Roijakkers 
(2009), Hipkin and Naude 
(2006), Huxham (2000)
Leadership issues related to governing in this stream 
of research are usually associated with the design of 
formal contracts between the network partners and 
the ensuing risks of such cooperations that stem 
from the accompanying inability to avoid all forms of 
risk (e.g. opportunism) by means of contractual 
obligations
In these studies legal and social control mechanisms are 
observed only with regard to specific single networks, but 
no interactions between different (forms of) networks are 
considered
 
Table 3: List of interviews.  
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Table 4: Composition of the panel. 
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Headquarters: Santa Clara/California (USA)
Main products: Microprocessor
RGF* activities: Financing of roadmap gaps
identified by the ITRS and
its own roadmap by means
of Intel Capital
Media Lario Technologies
Headquarters: Bosisio Parini (ITA)
Main products: Optical EUVL components
RGF activities: Acquisition of venture capital
for the development of EUVL
instruments from Intel Capital
and other venture capitalists
NaWoTec
Headquarters: Rossdorf (GER)
Main products: Photo mask repair tools
RGF activities: Acquisition of venture capital
for its tools from - first and
foremost - Intel Capital,
Wellington Partners and 
Target Partners.
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Figure 3: Intel as a network manoeuvring in different networks by leveraging its impact on the 
intertwined roadmaps (n.b.: P1-P3 represent the propositions we set out in depth in the remainder of 
the paper).  
Roadmapping
(ITRS related set of practices, i.e. (1) politicking, (2) 








   
   
   
   



































































































(by SEMATECH-affiliated ITRS organization)
ITRS-oriented 
roadmapping 
(re)produces and informs 




















(the roadmap as a 
medium of leadership) The roadmap is repeatedly
updated and the various 
actors present the results of 
the ITRS in their 
SEMATECH-meetings and 
discuss the relevance of it.
The roadmap is utilized as a
medium to exert power, that 
is, the actors engaged in the
formulation of the ITRS can
decide upon who joins the
network-related activities 
formulated in the ITRS.
Due to being a consensus-
based document, actors can 
be sanctioned. For instance, if 
a cooperation among 
competing actors fails, the 
network membership 
might actually be put at risk.
The roadmap represents the
formulation of joint objectives
and assumptions. Intel is 
aware of its guiding function, 
which is why politicking in the 
form of announcements are 
carefully made and serve as 
clues for the ITRS members.
The consensus-based nature 
of the roadmap legitimizes 




Within the roadmap those
technological options are
set forth that are formally
acknowledged as (not) being
worth pursuing. Partnering in 
the form of the EUV LLC 
resulted in a massive 
(re)channeling of resources.
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(the RGF as a 
medium of leadership) Relating to the RGF activities
of Intel, information among
industry, network and RGF
participants is exchanged.
Taking part in RGF allows
members of the respective
supply chain to exert power
de facto as (only) the specific 
technology is pursued.
Other industry actors decide 
to join (or leave) interorga-
nizational networks in order
to align their efforts with the
joint development activities 
relevant for RGF.
Intel exerts a guiding 
function. Hence, RGF 
investments are 
interpreted as a ‘sign’ to 
favour certain technological
options.
RGF as practised by Intel 
legitimizes the pursuit of 
EUV as a viable 
technological  option due to, 
among others, Intel Capital’s 
provision of technological 




Financial investments into 
EUV developing companies,
e.g. Media Lario
Technologies imply a 
(re)direction of finan-
cial resources, and influence




Figure 6: Managerial implications of this study. 
• Adopt a perspective that considers networks seperately instead
of assuming solely a 'macro'-oriented network portfolio approach, 
while at the same time broaden the scope of analysis beyond single 
networks  in order to allow for network manoeuvering
• Establish an awareness of outside-inside mechanisms particularly 
relevant for heterarchical networks, i.e. factors that might influence 
the activities in a heterarchical network to identify the potential 
phenomena or objects relevant for network manouevering
• Analyse your organization's embeddedness into other different 
interorganizational network engagements; in particular pay attention
to different forms of interorganizational networks 
• Target arenas where information can be disseminated that is likely to
influence relevant audiences, e.g. Conferences, in order to influence
consensus-based mechanisms prevailing in heterarchical networks
Managerial implications
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• Joint definition of ‘hard facts`
• Written document defining commonly agreed 
upon agenda
• ITRS offers industry-wide orientation
• Joint research and development activities
• Exchange of technical details




• “Placing clues”, i.e. making deliberate 
announcements concerning technological options
• Massive presence of Intel representatives at 
conferences
• Competition among different powerful actors
• Enabling access to financial capital
• ‘Brokering’ of new business opportunities
• Introduction to Intel Capital’s network of
cooperation partners
Financing
• Other actors closely follow Intel’s actions





• Offering access to testing facilities
• Training of technical and social skills
• Offering of technological expertise
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